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We study the effects of political participation on holdings of liquid assets in a transition 
economy. Previous research has shown that the risk of political extraction by politicians 
and bureaucrats in countries with weak institutions has an adverse effect on holdings of 
liquid assets. We propose that political participation by private entrepreneurs can function 
as a means to alleviate some of that risk. Our empirical results indicate that political 
participation is positively related to cash holdings in China, especially in regions with weak 
institutions proxied by lower GDP per capita, lower marketization levels, and weaker 
property protection. Cash holdings have a negative effect on firm value as measured by the 
market-to-book ratio. However, political participation, the combined effect of cash 
holdings and political participation, as well as the combined effect of cash holdings, 
political participation, and institutions are all positively associated with firm value. Political 
participation thus results in an improved ability for firms that function in an environment 
fraught with the risk of political extraction to increase their holdings of liquid assets as well 
as a related positive effect on firm value.  
 
JEL Classification: G31; G32; G34; P48 






1  Introduction 
Research has shown that bureaucrats and politicians often extract rent from 
firms. This is especially true for firms in developing economies which face ambiguous 
property rights and poor legal protection. In extreme cases, the state itself becomes 
predatory, thereby creating a severe impediment to continued economic development. 
While many countries are perhaps not characterized by the predatory state 
phenomenon, firms still face the risk of political extraction. Previous studies have 
shown how the so-called grabbing hand distorts the domestic economy and creates 
problems for firms that would otherwise be successful (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). When the grabbing hand is 
particularly present, firms may take action to protect their assets from political 
extraction in different ways, including diversification and tax avoidance.  
Caprio et al. (2008) analyze how firms structure their asset holdings in an 
attempt to avoid political extraction. They argue that such a strategy is likely to be 
most apparent in liquid asset choices. Since liquid assets are easier to steal than other 
assets such as property, plants, etc, they constitute a likely primary target for 
bureaucrats when they go after firm assets. Our paper extends this argument. We focus 
on how firms in China are influenced by the risk of political extraction. Our basic 
hypothesis is that firms with considerable political capital are less afraid to hold liquid 
assets such as cash. We test this by identifying private entrepreneurs who participate in 
politics. Through political participation, these entrepreneurs are able to develop strong  
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relationships with fellow politicians and thus become less concerned with the risk of 
political extraction. This means that they will not have to resort to hiding assets to the 
same extent as private entrepreneurs without such strong political networks.  
We propose two competing hypotheses for the influence of political 
participation on cash holdings. Besides the possibility that firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibit larger cash holdings than other 
entrepreneurial firms due to better protection against political extraction, previous 
research indicates that political connections may actually result in lower levels of cash 
holdings. If this effect dominates the relationship between political participation and 
cash holdings, one would expect a negative relationship between the two. The 
relationship thus needs to be analyzed empirically.  
Our results show that political participation by private entrepreneurs is indeed 
positively related to cash holdings in China. This indicates that political participation 
facilitates larger holdings of liquid assets. We believe that this finding is novel in that it 
adds a new dimension to the literature on political capital and rent seeking. The fact 
that political participation allows entrepreneurs to increase their firms’ cash holdings 
means that their political capital results in a potential competitive advantage. Previous 
research has shown that there are optimal cash holdings levels for firms (e.g. Kim et 
al., 1998). If the risk of political extraction is so severe that firms are forced to 
maintain suboptimal levels of cash holdings, political participation may allow for 
entrepreneurial firms to maintain an optimal cash holding level while their competitors 
are unable to do so.  
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We also find that institutions influence the effect that political participation has 
on cash holdings. In regions with low levels of economic development, low levels of 
marketization and weak property rights, political participation is a much more 
important determinant of cash holdings. In fact, when we include proxies for local 
institutions in the estimation, political participation on its own is no longer significant. 
Instead, political participation seems to work mainly through the interactive variable 
that combines institutions and political participation. We interpret this as political 
participation facilitating firms’ cash holdings in regions with weak institutions. 
Finally, we discuss the economic effect of cash holdings, political connections, 
and local institutions on firm value. We document that political participation is 
positively associated with firm value, a result that is consistent with Feng et al. (2011) 
who show that entrepreneurial political participation greatly benefits firms. However, 
we find no evidence that cash holdings by themselves have a significant effect on firm 
value. On the other hand, the interaction effects between cash holdings and political 
participation as well as the simultaneous influence of cash holdings, local institutions 
dummy and political participation, all have a significant positive effect on firm value. 
This shows that political participation facilitates the holding of liquid assets, which in 
turn results in better firm performance. Overall, our results complement those of 
Caprio et al. (2008) in that we identify a way for firms to solve the problem with 
implicit restrictions on cash holdings, especially for firms that are active in regions 
marked by weaker institutions.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop 
testable hypotheses for the relation between political participation and cash holdings. 
Section 3 introduces the concept of private entrepreneurs who participate in politics in 
China and then discusses how we measure political participation. Section 4 first 
introduces the data set and then presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the study.  
2  Hypothesis Development and Relation to Prior Literature 
There are a number of theories and empirical studies on the determinants of 
cash holdings in the literature. Early research mainly focuses on the tradeoff between 
the cost of holding cash and the cost of running out of cash or, alternatively, whether 
the level of cash holdings is irrelevant and instead based on a simple financing 
hierarchy (Miller and Orr, 1966; Opler et al., 1999). More recent studies have 
identified other factors that may influence cash holdings. For example, Mikkelson and 
Partach (2003) study the relationship between cash holdings and stock ownership by 
insiders or institutional investors. Dittmar et al., (2003), Kalcheva and Lins, (2007) and 
Pinkowitz et al. (2003) further show that the level of protection of shareholder rights 
influence firms’ cash holdings decisions.  
In addition to these factors, we suggest that strong ties to politicians through 
entrepreneurs’ political participation may influence cash holding decisions in countries 
with weak institutions. We put forward two competing hypotheses for the relationship 
between political participation and cash holdings. What we call the political extraction  
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hypothesis focuses on the argument that firms in regions marked by weak institutions 
face a higher risk of political extraction. Since liquid assets are easier to extract, firms 
will protect themselves by decreasing their cash holdings (e.g. Caprio et al., 2008). 
Besides the often-used method of carrying out unofficial activities, firms can alleviate 
some of the risk of political extraction by developing close ties to politicians.
1 While 
this approach most likely entails additional costs, it may enable the firm to work more 
efficiently, thus resulting in an overall positive effect on firm value. It has been shown 
in numerous studies that political connections have a significant positive effect on firm 
value, especially in countries with weak institutions (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006). We suggest that one possible benefit 
of private entrepreneurs’ political participation is the access to political networks 
through which it is possible to decrease the risk of political extraction. If political ties 
are exploited this way, we thus expect that political participation is positively 
associated with cash holdings.  
What can be called the capital access theory, on the other hand, suggests that 
the relationship between political participation and cash holdings is very different. 
Related studies have shown that private entrepreneurs are able to exploit their political 
networks to gain preferential access to capital (e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja 
                                                 
1 One alternative way for firms in developing countries to escape corruption and the grabbing hand is to 
increase their unofficial activities, thus making it more difficult for bureaucrats to extract rent from them 
(e.g. Johnson et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Friedman et al., 2000).  
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and Mian, 2005), and that firms with good access to capital markets usually hold less 
cash (Opler et al., 1999). If this effect is strong, it may dominate the political extraction 
effect and we can thus expect a negative correlation between political participation and 
cash holdings. To identify the dominant effect in the relationship between political 
participation and cash holdings, we therefore have to resort to empirical analysis. We 
put forward the following competing hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a (the political extraction argument): Political participation by the 
controlling private entrepreneur is positively associated with cash holdings 
 
Hypothesis 1b (the capital access argument): Political participation by the 
controlling private entrepreneur is negatively associated with cash holdings 
 
In a related study, Caprio et al. (2008) document that cash holdings are also 
associated with the quality of institutions, in their case measured by several proxies for 
corruption. They find that a higher level of corruption results in smaller cash holdings, 
which helps reducing the grabbing hand effect. Since our political extraction 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that political participation may play a more 
important role for escaping political extraction when weaker institutions are present, 
we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effects of political participation on cash holdings are related 





Finally, we focus on the direct effects of cash holdings and political participation 
on firm value. Previous research has shown that political participation by private 
entrepreneurs in China is positively associated with firm value (Feng et al., 2011). 
However, research on the effect of cash holdings on firm value has not shown a 
definitive general relationship. Due to its importance for firms in China, political 
participation may influence the relationship between cash holdings and firm value as 
well as the relationship between institutions and firm value. We thus suggest the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Political participation by the controlling private entrepreneur is 
positively associated with firm value 
 
Hypothesis 4: The effects of cash holdings on firm value are related to political 
participation 
 
Hypothesis 5: The effects of institutions on cash holdings are related to 
political participation 
 
3  Political Participation by Private Entrepreneurs and Institutions 
3.1  Identifying Political Participation 
Having experienced long periods of discrimination during the initial phase of 




2   This study focuses on private entrepreneurs that decide to 
participate in politics. In our sample, we follow the related literature and identify 
shareholders who control more than 10% of the outstanding shares of a company and 
are listed as the ultimate controlling shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Bortolotti and 
Faccio, 2009).  
To control for indirect political participation, we also consider the possibility 
that a member of the private entrepreneur’s family participates in politics. As a proxy 
for political participation, we use membership in one of three key state entities: the 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). We also 
include participation at the provincial level in each of the three entities. We believe 
that such a position serves well as a proxy for political participation. The CCCP is held 
once every five years and can be seen as the highest body within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The NPC formally acts as the highest organ of the state and 
functions as the country’s legislative body, while the CPPCC functions as a political 
advisory body that is comprised of members from different parties and organizations as 
well as individuals.  
                                                 
2 According to Tsai (2007), there were about 30 million registered private companies in China in 2005. 
This accounted for circa half of China’s GDP. Dougherty et al. (2007) document how private firms’ 
share of total industrial product increased from 25% in 1998 to over 50% in 2003.  
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3.2  Rent-Seeking Opportunities and the Benefits of Political Participation 
Previous research has found that local institutions are related to the level of 
rent-seeking opportunities in a country. In the literature on corruption and the grabbing 
hand phenomenon, it has been shown that rent seeking and corruption are associated 
with lower economic development (e.g., Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Mauro, 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). For example, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) document how institutions are associated with cross-country variations in 
income. Previous studies have also focused on how strong property rights and an 
effective rule of law limit rent seeking. We expand our analysis on the influence of 
political participation on holdings of liquid assets with three different proxies for local 
institutions to find more robust results.  
Economic development is often used when analyzing issues such as the 
grabbing hand, corruption, and political connections. For example, Treisman (2000) 
shows that lower economic development is related to higher corruption. In her study on 
political connections, Faccio (2006) also uses GDP per capita as a simple proxy for 
local institutions. Therefore, we use the same approach in this paper and divide the 
firms into two groups based on whether their headquarters are located in a province 
with high and low GDP per capita, respectively.   
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We also use the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of 
Marketization
3  for China’s provinces to proxy for local institutions because more 
developed markets can improve local institutions in a transition economy such as 
China (Wang et al, 2007).
 We thus divide the sample into two groups based on the 
level of marketization. Finally, to analyze the impact of local differences in property 
rights’ protection, we use a World Bank survey from 2006 that focuses on China’s 
larger cities (World Bank, 2006). The entrepreneurial firms are thus divided into two 
groups depending on whether or not their headquarters are located in places with 
relatively higher levels of property protection. Summing up, low real GDP per capita, 
low levels of marketization, and weak property rights should be conducive for rent 
seeking. Following hypothesis 2 above, we expect the effect of political participation 
on the size of cash holdings to be significantly influenced by local institutions. 
                                                 
3 The NERI index focuses on provinces’ progress towards a market economy relative to other provinces. 
Each province is given a score between zero and ten. The index is based on 23 indicators of institutional 
arrangements and policies in five areas: size of the regional government; economic structure (growth of 
the non-state sector and the reform of state-controlled firms); inter-regional trade barriers; development 
of factor markets; and the legal framework (Wang et al., 2007).  
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4  Empirical Analysis 
4.1  Data and Sample Description 
We manually collect data on private entrepreneurs and their political 
participation for all listed firms on the two stock exchanges in China. To avoid 
problems with potential differences in accounting methods, we focus on firms that 
have only issued A-shares.
4 We extract financial data for all firms from the China 
Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We then delete 
observations with missing data, negative equity, etc. To minimize potential effects due 
to IPOs or reverse mergers, we also require the firms to be listed for at least two years 
to be included in the data set. Listed firms in China disclose cash and short-term 
securities on their balance sheets since 1990. However, their cash flow statements, 
which include cash and cash-equivalent posts, were not disclosed until 1998 when new 
regulations were issued by the Ministry of Finance. Our sample therefore covers the 
period 1999-2009.  
  Table 1 provides a description of the data sample. The first column presents the 
total number of firms that have listed A-shares and no B-shares, while the second 
                                                 
4 Chinese firms have been listing A- and B-shares, which differ from each other based on investor 
brackets. Domestic investors are allowed to trade A-shares, while B-shares have traditionally been 
traded by foreign investors. As a result of a share reform in 2001, domestic investors are allowed to 
trade in B-shares. Only a minority of the listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen have issued B-shares. 
For more information on different share classes and share-class reforms, see Chan et al., (2007, 2008).   
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column shows the number of these firms that are controlled by a private entrepreneur. 
Column three presents the total number of firms that are controlled by private 
entrepreneurs in our final sample, and column 4 shows the sample firms as a 
percentage of all listed firms that have only issued A-shares. Panel A shows that the 
number of firms controlled by private entrepreneurs was modest during the beginning 
of the sample, but that such firms have come to constitute an increasingly large share 
of the total number of listed firms in China. The total number of listed firms in the 
sample grew from 822 in 1999 to 1,570 in 2009, while the total number of listed firms 
controlled by private entrepreneurs increased from 71 to 659 during the same period. 
In total, we have 13,221 observations for all A-share firms. After deleting firm 
observations with missing accounting data or negative equity, our final sample consists 
of 2,115 (out of a total of 3,424) observations for firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs.  
  Panel B in Table 1 presents the distribution of firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics. The number of such firms increased from a 
modest 9 to 173 during the sample period. The share of the total number of firms 
controlled by private entrepreneurs grew from 23% to 44% during 1999-2009, a 
change that is likely at least partly a result of an increasing number of private 
entrepreneurs realizing the benefits of participating in politics. In our final sample, we 
thus have a total of 2,115 firms controlled by private entrepreneurs and 868 
observations of firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics.  
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4.2  Political Participation and Cash Holdings 
We begin the empirical analysis by focusing on how political participation by 
controlling entrepreneurs affects holdings in liquid assets. We first use univariate tests 
to look at differences in cash holdings depending on whether or not the controlling 
private entrepreneur is participating in politics. For robustness, we use three different 
definitions of cash holdings: the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; the 
ratio of cash to total assets. Table 2 presents univariate tests for differences in the mean 
and median of cash holdings for the two groups of privately controlled firms. In two 
out of the three cases, the mean of cash holdings for firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics is significantly larger than that of other 
privately controlled firms. For all three definitions of cash holdings, the median of cash 
holdings for firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is 
significantly larger than that of other entrepreneurial firms. The initial between-group 
tests thus indicate that political participation is positively associated with cash 
holdings. 
  To obtain more robust results on the relationship between political participation 
by private entrepreneurs and firms’ cash holdings, we run several different forms of 
regressions, including a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression, a Tobit 
regression, and a fixed effect regression. For the OLS regression, we report robust t 
statistics. We include a Tobit regression to take the potential issue of censored 
dependent variables into account. Finally, the fixed-effect model takes firm-specific  
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effects into account. The dependent variable is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to 
total assets.
5  The main independent variable is political participation, a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the controlling private entrepreneur is participating in 
politics and zero otherwise. We also include a number of control variables found in the 
literature on determinants of cash holdings: sales growth, measured as the difference in 
the natural logarithm of sales between years t and t-1; financial leverage measured as 
the ratio of short- and long-term debt to total assets; firm size, measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets; profitability, measured as the return on assets (ROA); 
operating cash flow, measured as the ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets; 
change in net working capital, measured as the change in the ratio of net working 
capital over total assets; investment, measured as the change in fixed assets plus 
inventory over total assets; ownership rights, measured as entrepreneurial cash-flow 
rights; control minus ownership, measured as the difference between entrepreneurial 
control rights and cash-flow rights; and finally industry and year dummies for the OLS 
and Tobit regressions. In the fixed effect model, ownership rights and control minus 
ownership are not included since such data is only available for 2009. Because firms’ 
ownership structures generally change slowly, we assume that these two ownership 
                                                 
5 For brevity, we only provide the regression results using the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets as dependent variable. The results are similar when using the alternative measures for cash 
holdings as dependent variable.  
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variables are constant. To reduce the effect of outliers, we also winsorize the variables 
at the top and bottom 5%. 
  Table 2 presents the results of the three different regressions. Regardless of 
which type of regression we use, the coefficient for political participation remains 
significant and positive. This shows that political participation is positively associated 
with cash holdings, a result that supports the political extraction hypothesis. If the 
capital access theory were to dominate the political extraction theory, we would expect 
the coefficient to be negative and significant. Overall, firms with controlling private 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics tend to hold more cash, indicating that 
political participation results in important political networks which in turn enable firms 
to increase their holdings of liquid assets without fearing political extraction.  
4.3  The Influence of Local Institutions 
To better understand how local institutions affect the relationship between 
political participation and cash holdings, we run new regressions in which we include 
the proxies for rent-seeking opportunities discussed in Section 3.2. We first focus our 
analysis on economic development and divide the sample into two groups based on the 
GDP per capita of the provinces where the headquarters of the firms are located. We 
then run new between-group tests in each of the two subsamples to see how economic 
development affects the relationship between political participation and cash holdings.  
Panel A in Table 3 presents the results for the between-group mean and median 
tests. It is evident that economic development has a significant effect on the influence  
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of political participation on cash holdings. In provinces with low GDP per capita, the 
effect of political participation on cash holdings is strong, resulting in larger cash 
holdings for firms with political participation. When we divide the sample based on 
whether or not the controlling private entrepreneur participates in politics, we find no 
significant difference in cash holdings for firms located in provinces with high GDP 
per capita. These initial results indicate that economic development influences the 
positive effect political participation has on cash holdings.  
When we instead use marketization and property rights as proxies for local 
institutions, the results are similar. Panel B shows that when we divide firms based on 
political participation by the controlling entrepreneur, there is no significant effect in 
regions where the level of marketization is high. When the level of marketization is 
low, firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics hold significantly 
more cash. Similarly, Panel C in Table 3 shows that cash holdings of firms controlled 
by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is significantly larger in provinces with 
poorer property rights, while there is no difference in provinces with stronger property 
rights.  
To further control for the possible influence of other factors, we again run 
multivariate regressions. We use pooled OLS regressions, Tobit regressions, and 
Logistic transformation regressions to find more robust results. The dependent variable 
is once more the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets
6. We include all 
                                                 
6 The results are similar when we use the alternative measures for cash holdings as dependent variable.  
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control variables used in the previous regressions as well as local institutions dummies. 
We focus on the interaction effect of political participation and the institutions proxy to 
find how the two interact together to influence firms’ cash holding decisions.  
 Table 4 reports the regression results. The institutions dummy in the 
regressions presented in Panel A is economic development. The results show that when 
we take local institutions and the interactive variable of political participation and local 
institutions into account, the coefficient for political participation becomes smaller and 
insignificant. The coefficient for institutions is highly significant and negative, an 
expected result since the institutions dummy is equal to one for provinces with low 
economic development. Finally, the interactive variable is positive and significant 
regardless of which form of regression we use. Panels B and C present the alternative 
regressions with marketization and property rights as proxies for institutions. The 
results are similar to those in Panel A, with the coefficient for political participation 
positive but not significant, the coefficient for institutions negative and significant, and 
the interactive variable between political participation and institutions positive and 
significant.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 show how important institutions are for firms in 
China. More importantly, they also show that local differences in institutions influence 
the effect that political participation has on the size of cash holdings in private firms. 
While the impact of political participation on its own becomes insignificant, the 
interactive variable that combines institutions and political participation is highly 
significant in all three alternative regressions. The empirical results in Tables 3 and 4  
19 
 
thus highlight that political participation mainly contributes to increased cash holdings 
in regions marked by weak local institutions. This finding again supports the theory 
that political participation by private entrepreneurs and the resulting political networks 
can be utilized to mitigate risk when the firm functions in an environment marked by a 
higher risk for political extraction.   
4.4  The Value of Cash Holdings 
So far, our results indicate that entrepreneurs’ political participation greatly 
influences private firms’ cash holding decisions, especially in regions with weaker 
institutions. In this subsection, we further discuss its economic effects on firm value. 
Looking at how cash holdings, political participation, and institutions affect firm value 
is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, if investors perceive that entrepreneurial 
political participation can reduce bureaucratic political extraction, then the value they 
place on firms’ cash holdings should increase accordingly. Confirming the existence of 
such a relationship would complement the results in the last section. Secondly, looking 
at firm value of the interaction effects, we may find a specific mechanism through 
which political participation functions, thereby contributing to the literature on 
political connections. 
We estimate pooled OLS regressions with market-to-book value as the 
dependent variable. Our focus is cash holdings, political participation, and institutions, 
and their interactive variables. To once more control for the possible influence of other  
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factors, we add a series of control variables similar to the ones used in the previous 
section.  
  The regression results are presented in Table 5. The table consists of three 
panels with the three different proxies for institutions. For each setup of independent 
variables, we again use three alternative measures for liquid assets: the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalent assets to total assets; the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets minus cash and cash equivalents; and the ratio of cash to total assets. Panel A 
presents the result with GDP per capita as the institutions dummy. Several findings are 
worth noticing. First, cash holdings have a significant negative impact on the market-
to-book ratio. Second, political participation is positively associated with market value. 
Third, the coefficient for the interactive variable cash holding*political participation is 
significant and positive, indicating that political participation works through the 
holdings of liquid assets. Fourth, the coefficient for the interactive variable of political 
participation and institutions is also positive and significant. Fifth, the coefficient for 
the interactive variable that combines all three of these factors is significant and 
positive. Panels B and C in Table 5 present results that are very similar to those of 
Panel A. Although cash holdings on its own is again a negative influence on market 
value, political participation and all the interactive variables that include political 
participation are all positively associated with the market-to-book ratio. These results 




  The results in Table 5 show how important political participation is for firm 
value. It also shows that cash holdings as an independent variable has a negative 
influence on firm value, but that firms controlled by private entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics exhibit a positive relationship between firm value and the 
interaction between local institutions and cash holdings. This indicates that 
entrepreneurs are able to expand their cash holdings and use them to increase firm 
value. Furthermore, local institutions do not affect firm value independently from other 
factors. Instead, private entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to exploit 
rent-seeking opportunities in areas with low GDP per capita, low levels of 
marketization, and weak property protection. 
5  Conclusion 
This study documents how firms controlled by private entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics are able to increase firm competitiveness and value. Our initial 
results indicate that holdings of liquid assets are positively associated with political 
participation by the controlling entrepreneur. When we add local institutions, we find 
that the positive effect of political participation on cash holdings is important in areas 
with poor institutions. This supports the political extraction hypothesis, which states 
that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics will hold more cash 
because of the lower risk of political extraction as a result of ties to leading politicians. 
These results complement those of Caprio et al. (2008), who show that firms hold less 
cash holdings in countries with weaker institutions. We also find that political  
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participation has a positive influence on firm value. Our results support the findings in 
earlier studies that politically connected firms are able to exploit rent-seeking 
opportunities, especially in economies marked by weak institutions. We also find that 
cash holdings have a negative effect on firm value, but that the interactive variable 
composed of cash holdings and political participation is positively associated with firm 
value. These findings indicate that firms are able to exploit their entrepreneurs’ 
political connections and benefit from optimal cash holdings strategies that normal 
entrepreneurial firms cannot use. 
  Our results underline that cash holdings are important for firms in transition 
economies, but that the risk of political extraction makes it difficult for firms to pursue 
optimal strategies that focus on the holdings of liquid assets. One way to mitigate the 
risk of political extraction is for the controlling private entrepreneur to participate in 
politics, and the resulting political connections decrease the risk of local bureaucrats or 
politicians extracting rent from the company. We believe that our results are useful 
when analyzing the behavior of entrepreneurial firms and how they deal with the risk 
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Table 1. Sample 
 
Panel A: Distribution of entrepreneurial firms 
This panel presents the distribution of entrepreneurial sample firms by year between 
1999-2009. A-share firms are ones that have only issued A-shares on one of China’s 
stock exchanges. Entrepreneurial firms refer to firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs or their families. Sample firms are the firms included in our study after 
deleting missing data or observations with negative equities.  
 
Year  Number of 
A-share firms 






Sample  Firms 
Number  As percentage of 
all listed A-share 
firms  
1999 822  71  39  4.74 
2000 955  96  60  6.28 
2001 1025  119  79  7.71 
2002 1085  152  95  8.76 
2003 1146  213  124  10.82 
2004 1236  291  163  13.19 
2005 1240  324  216  17.42 
2006 1287  404  245  19.04 
2007 1396  519  320  22.92 
2008 1459  576  383  26.25 
2009 1570  659  391  24.90 
Total 13221  3424  2115  16.00 











Table 1. Sample (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of entrepreneurial firms and political participation 
This panel presents the distribution of sample firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics. Political participation is defined as the 
controlling entrepreneur (or his/her family members) being a member of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), or any of their 
provincial counterparts at the end of the fiscal year.  
 
Year  Number of  
sample firms 
Firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate 
in politics 
Numbers  As percentage of 
sample firms 
1999 39  9  23.08 
2000 60  14  23.33 
2001 79  19  24.05 
2002 95  23  24.21 
2003 124  58  46.77 
2004 163  77  47.24 
2005 216  99  45.83 
2006 245  106  43.27 
2007 320  121  37.81 
2008 383  169  44.13 
2009 391  173  44.25 
Total 2115  868  41.04 29 
 
Table 2. Effect of political participation on cash holdings 
 
Panel A: Univariate Tests 
This panel presents univariate tests for cash holding in firms controlled by private 
entrepreneurs, sorted by whether or not the controlling entrepreneur participates in 
politics. The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents, the ratio of cash to 
total assets are all included for robustness. T-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test are alternately provided for the difference in the mean and median of cash 
holdings for entrepreneurial firms with and without political participation. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents 
to total assets  
 
Ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents to 
total assets minus 
cash and cash 
equivalents  
Ratio of cash to 














Observations 868  868  868 
      



























Table 2. Effect of political participation on cash holdings (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
This table presents results from regressions in which the dependent variable is 
defined as the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets. The independent 
variables include: Political participation, which equals one if the controlling 
entrepreneur participates in politics and zero otherwise; Sales growth, measured as 
the difference in the natural logarithm of sales between year t and year t-1; Financial 
leverage, measured as the ratio of the sum of short term debt and long term debt to 
total assets; Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; Profitability, 
measured as the return on assets (ROA); Operating cash flow, measured as the ratio 
of cash flow from operations to total assets; Delta NWC / assets, measured as the 
change in net working capital over total assets; Investment / assets, measured as the 
change in fixed assets and inventory over total assets; Ownership rights, measured 
as entrepreneurial cash-flow rights; Control minus ownership, measured as the 
difference between entrepreneurial control rights and cash-flow rights. Industry and 
year dummies are also included but not reported. The pooled OLS regression in 
model (1) is applied with robust t statistics which are given in parentheses. The 
Tobit model in model (2) is used due to the censored dependent variable. The fixed 
effect model in model (3) is provided to take potential firm-specific effects into 
account. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%.  ***, **, and * 
























Table 2. Effect of political participation on cash holdings (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 
  Pooled OLS  Tobit  Fixed effect 




































































Industry indicators  Yes  Yes  No 
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  No 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.184     
Sigma   0.096   
(65.04) 
 
F test for no fixed 
effects 
   6.55 
R









Table 3. Univariate tests for entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions 
This table reports univariate tests for entrepreneurial cash holdings on subsamples partitioned by local factors. Cash holdings 1 is the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalent to total assets. Cash holdings 2 is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. 
Cash holdings 3 is the ratio of cash to total assets. T-tests and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are alternately provided for the difference in the 
mean and median of entrepreneurial cash holdings for firms controlled by private entrepreneurs that participate in politics and common 
entrepreneurial firms. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
In panel A, the sample is partitioned by the sample median value of local GDP per capita. In panel B, the sample is partitioned by 
whether or not the firm’s headquarter is located in a more developed region, using the sample median value of the National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s provinces. In panel C, the sample is partitioned by the level of property protection, 
based on a survey by the World Bank (2006). 
 












Panel A: Real GDP per capita 
  Low GDP per capita    High GDP per capita 



























Observations 454  521      394  668   
           
  33 
 
Table 3: Univariate tests for entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions (Continued) 
 












Panel B: Marketization (average NERI Index during 2001-2005)  
  Low  level of marketization    High level of marketization 



























Number of firms  474  579      383  650   
Panel C: Property protection 
  Low level of property protection    High level of property protection 



























Observations 359  481     509  763   34 
 
Table 4. Entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions 
This table presents the regression results of the effects of political participation on 
entrepreneurial cash holdings, sorted by local institutions. The dependent variable in 
this table is measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. The 
independent variables include: Political participation, which equals one if the 
controlling entrepreneur participates in politics and zero otherwise; Sales growth, 
measured as the difference in the natural logarithm of sales between year t and year 
t-1; Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of the sum of short term debt and long 
term debt to total assets; Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
Profitability, measured as the return on assets (ROA); Operating cash flow, 
measured as the ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets; Delta NWC / 
assets, measured as the change in net working capital over total assets; Investment / 
assets, measured as the change in fixed assets and inventory over total assets; 
Ownership rights, measured as entrepreneurial cash-flow rights; Control minus 
ownership, measured as the difference between entrepreneurial control rights and 
cash-flow rights. Industry and year dummies are also included but not reported. 
Model (1) is estimated with a pooled OLS regression. Robust t statistics are given in 
parentheses. Model (2) is estimated with a Tobit regression to take censored 
dependent variable into account. Model (3) is estimated with a logistic 
transformation regression in which the dependent variable  i z   is computed as 
    ln 1 ii i z yy  . Here,  i y  is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets 
are also provided. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%. ***, **, 





















Table 4. Entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions (Continued) 
 
Panel A: GDP per capita 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by local GDP per capita, measured 
as above or below the sample median value of local average real GDP per capita 
during 1979-2007. If local GDP per capita in the province where the firm’s 
headquarter is located is below the sample median value, the institutions proxy is 
equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 Pooled  OLS  Tobit  Logistic 
transformation 


















































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.197    0.161 







Table 4. Entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Marketization 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by whether or not the firm’s 
headquarter is located in a relatively more developed region, using the National 
Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s provinces. 
If the firm’s headquarter is located in a less developed region, the institutions 
dummy is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 Pooled  OLS  Tobit  Logistic 
transformation 


















































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.187    0.149 







Table 4. Entrepreneurial cash holdings and local institutions (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Property protection 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by whether or not the firm’s 
headquarter is located in a province that has a higher level of property protection 
based on a World Bank field survey (World Bank, 2006). If the firm’s headquarter is 
located in a province that has a lower level of property protection, the institutions 
dummy is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 Pooled  OLS  Tobit  Logistic 
transformation 


















































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.187    0.146 







Table 5. The value of entrepreneurial cash holdings  
 
This table presents the regression results of the value of entrepreneurial cash 
holdings. The dependent variable is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. The independent 
variables include: Cash holdings, alternately measured as the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets in model (1), the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total 
assets minus cash and cash equivalent in model (2), and the ratio of cash to total 
assets in model (3); Political participation, which equals one if the controlling 
entrepreneur participates in politics and zero otherwise; the institutions dummy; the 
interaction of cash holdings and political participation; the interaction of political 
participation and institutions; the interaction of cash holdings, political participation, 
and institutions; Sales growth, measured as the difference in the natural logarithm of 
sales between year t and year t-1; Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of the 
sum of short term debt and long term debt to total assets; Size, measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets; Profitability, measured as the return on assets 
(ROA); Ownership rights, measured as entrepreneurial cash-flow rights; Control 
minus ownership, measured as the difference between entrepreneurial control rights 
and cash-flow rights. Industry and year dummies are also included but not reported. 
Pooled OLS regressions are applied and robust t statistics are given in parentheses. 
All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%. ***, **, and * denote 

























Table 5. The value of entrepreneurial cash holdings (Continued) 
 
Panel A: GDP per capita 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by local GDP per capita, measured 
as above or below the sample median value of local average real GDP per capita 
during 1979-2007. If local GDP per capita in the provinces where the firm’s 
headquarter is located is below the sample median value, the institutions proxy is 
equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 (1) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents  
to total assets 
(2) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents to total 
assets minus cash 
and cash equivalents 
(3) 
Cash  
to total assets 





























































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.230  0.229  0.229 
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Table 5. The value of entrepreneurial cash holdings (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Marketization 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by whether or not the firm’s 
headquarter is located in a relatively more developed region, using the National 
Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s provinces. 
If the firm’s headquarter is located in a less developed region, the institutions 
dummy is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 (1) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents  
to total assets 
(2) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents to total 
assets minus cash 
and cash equivalents 
(3) 
Cash  
to total assets 





























































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.230  0.230  0.230 
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Table 5. The value of entrepreneurial cash holdings (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Property protection 
In this panel, the institutions dummy is proxied by whether or not the firm’s 
headquarter is located in a province that has a higher level of property protection 
based on a World Bank field survey (World Bank, 2006). If the firm’s headquarter is 
located in a province that has a lower level of property protection, the institutions 
dummy is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
 
 (1) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents  
to total assets 
(2) 
Cash and cash 
equivalents to total 
assets minus cash 
and cash equivalents 
(3) 
Cash  
to total assets 





























































































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2115  2115  2115 
Adjusted R
2 0.229  0.229  0.230 
 